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ENFORCEMENT OF THE COMMON LAW RULES
OF ARREST: A HANDCUFFING OF POLICE?
DOUGLAS D. Mc BROOM*
INTRODUCTION
"In the streets, the only law is that at the end of the policeman's nightstick." The degree of truth in this statement has long been a subject of
concern among civil libertarians. Nevertheless, police agencies were for
many years left to their own devices in meeting the essential problem of
keeping order on the streets; only a small portion of their actions were
subject to judicial review.
In the past decade however, this almost absolute discretion which was
vested in the police has been challenged. This challenge has taken two
primary forms: (1) the establishment of government agencies such as the
Neighborhood Legal Services which work to ensure the full spectrum of
legal protections and remedies to every person, and (2) judicial decisions
which have redefined the scope of police action in some areas of enforcement.
Much attention has been focused on the latter. It has been repeatedly
argued that recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, because
of the restrictions they impose on police investigations, are a substantial
factor in the rapidly rising crime rate.
Much less attention has been given to the problems involving the
policeman's power to effect arrests for minor offenses. In such offenses
none of the "big" questions of search and seizure or interrogation apply.
Nevertheless, it is in this area that the law has truly "handcuffed" the
policeman in the sense that it prohibits him from functioning in a manner
consistent with the general expectations of the community.
It is not the purpose of this article to add to the growing body of
literature which criticizes the new legal restraints placed on the police,
whether in the form of judicial decisions or legal agencies working to
enforce legal restraints which have long existed. Rather, the purpose here
is to objectively examine the effect of these restrictions on the policeman's
attitude toward his job and on his ability to perform it. To this end, the
first section of the article will deal with the limitations placed on police
authority in the enforcement of selected summary and misdemeanor
statutes and some of the problems which these limitations impose. The
second section will discuss the effect of recent landmark decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in terms of the overall effect which they
have had on the police officer's ability to do his job.
* A.B., J.D., University of Chicago. Member of Pennsylvania and Washington Bars.
Presently legal advisor to the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police.
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I
There are two rules which govern the law of arrest for minor offenses,
both of which have a common law background. One might be denominated the strict rule: A police officer may make an arrest without a
warrant for an offense which does not amount to a felony only when that
offense is a breach of peace committed in the presence of the arresting
officer. This is the rule which pertains in Pennsylvania.' The other rule
is that a police officer may effect an arrest without warrant for a breach
of the peace upon the same grounds as for a felony, that is, the officer
need not view the offense, but may arrest when he has probable cause
to believe that the offense has been committed. There is no conflict between this second, less restrictive, rule and the "fundamental criteria"
on what constitutes a reasonable seizure of the person set forth in the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court.2 Several States have by
statute given their peace officers the expanded authority to arrest represented by the second rule.'
The continuing existence of the "strict" rule in Pennsylvania coupled
with the new focus on the enforcement of this rule has left peace officers
in this state with inadequate powers to enforce some provisions of the
substantive criminal law. The paragraphs below will examine the effect
of the limitations which the rule places on law enforcement practices in
a number of selected areas.
Shoplifting. Shoplifting is, in Pennsylvania, a summary offense.4 The
statute provides that a merchant or peace officer apprehending a person
with concealed goods either inside or outside a store may detain that
person for a reasonable length of time "in order that recovery of such goods
may be effected." The statute does not, however, authorize the offender's
arrest and transportation to a magistrate. Thus if, as is usually the case,
the merchant apprehends the shoplifter and recovers his merchandise
before the police arrive, the police have no power to assist the merchant
in bringing the shoplifter to justice. The officer who did not view the
summary offense cannot effect an arrest and the burden is upon the
merchant to file a complaint before a magistrate and see that a summons
is issued to the shoplifter.' However, if the merchant should attempt to
proceed in this manner, he will be unsuccessful unless he can ascertain
the name and address of the offender. While a John Doe summons may
be issued when the identity of the offender is unknown, such summons
1. Commonwealth v. Collins, 15 Phila. 383 (1881); McCullough v. Commonwealth, 67
Pa. 30 (1870).
2. This area has been left open in leading cases on the subject. See Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963) ; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). The common law distinction between
a misdemeanor and a felony has been blurred. In today's criminal law some misdemeanors
are more serious, and call for more severe punishment, than many felonies. Thus, there is
nothing unreasonable in providing that an arrest for a misdemeanor may be made upon
the same grounds as those for a felony.
3. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 84.090, 84.710 (1959).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4861.1 (Supp., 1967).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 102 (Supp., 1967).
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are, for obvious reasons, almost impossible to serve. The police officer
arriving on the scene after the crime has been committed has no authority
to compel the suspect to reveal his identity. Thus, a shoptlifter caught in
the act of his offense can walk away from his victim and from any police
officer who has been called to the scene. Unless his identity is known to
either the merchant or the officer, he is, for all practical purposes, immune
from punishment.
Street Peddlers. Second class cities in Pennsylvania are given the power
to regulate street sales within their jurisdiction.' A Pittsburgh city
ordinance provides that no peddler shall operate in the city without a
permit and that no permits shall be issued for sales within certain
specified areas of the city.7 Police are responsible for the enforcement of
this ordinance. If a police officer observes a peddler operating within one
of the prohibited areas, he may approach the peddler and inform him
that he is violating the law, but he must not arrest him. Even though in
this case he has observed the commission of the offense, street peddling
does not amount to a breach of the peace. If the peddler is to receive
the prescribed punishment for his offense, the officer who observed the
violation must ascertain the peddler's identity, swear out a complaint
before a magistrate, and serve a summons on the offender. But how is
the officer to learn who the peddler is or where the summons can be
served? He has no authority to compel the peddler to reveal this information. Thus, the peddler who refuses to disclose his identity to the police
may proceed in open violation of the law with impunity.
Loitering. Pittsburgh's loitering ordinance9 states in part that "any
person or persons who shall be found loitering at the corners of or on the
public streets ... and shall refuse to vacate such place, when requested
so to do by any policeman . . . shall be fined." While this ordinance is

patently unconstitutional" it has not been challenged in the courts and
is still in effect in Pittsburgh. However, application of this ordinance has
been limited to situations viewed by police involving: (1) the blocking of
streets or sidewalks, (2) the blocking of entrances to public buildings,
and (3) the verbal harassment of peaceful passersby."
In a typical situation the police receive a call from a merchant complaining that a gang of youths is blocking the sidewalk or entrance to his
store. But no action can be taken unless the condition exists when the
police arrive. Furthermore, police have no power to prevent the youths
from assuming the same posture after their departure.
If residents of a neighborhood complain to police that they cannot
§ 23158 (Supp., 1967).
7. Pittsburgh, Pa., ordinance No. 375 of 1934, § 1.
8. Commonwealth v. Krubeck, 8 Pa. Dist. 521 (1899).
9. Pittsburgh, Pa., ordinance No. 89 of 1880, § 1.
10. See, Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); Brown v. Louisiana, 383
U.S. 131 (1966).
11. 2 Pittsburgh Bureau of Police Training Bulletin, # 4 (May 1968).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
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leave their homes without being harassed or insulted by youths idling on
the streets or without having their property vandalized by youths, the
police, unless they actually view the harassment or vandalism taking
place, can offer little protection to the complaining citizens.
If a prostitute stands on a street corner and openly solicits passersby,
no action can be taken unless the police actually hear the solicitation, or
one of the persons solicited signs a complaint against the prostitute. The
police officer cruising by a woman he knows to be a prostitute can do
nothing to remove her from the street.
Disorderly Conduct. The statute prohibits any "loud, boisterous and
unseemly noise . . .to the annoyance of the peaceable residents near

by .. ,12 The resident or merchant who is intimidated by a disorderly
gang can and usually does call the police. With the approach of the
police car, the disturbance naturally subsides. But because the officer
arriving on the scene does not actually view the elements of the offense,
he lacks the authority to restore lasting order. If he commands the youths
to stop disrupting the neighborhood, his only way to enforce such a command is to remain at the scene. Once he leaves, the gang will resume its
disorderly demeanor. The youths can tell the officer to "get lost" and, as
long as the reply is not in a loud and boisterous manner, remain immune
from lawful arrest.
Assault and Battery. A person who makes an unprovoked attack on
another citizen, whether it be a mere touching resulting in no significant
injury 1" or a malicious beating or stabbing resulting in "grievous bodily
harm" to the victim,' 4 is immune from arrest without a warrant unless
the attack is witnessed by a police officer. If the officer arrives on the
scene seconds after the attack and the injured victim is able to point out
his attacker fleeing down the street, the officer may pursue the attacker,
detain him momentarily, and frisk him.' 5 If in this frisk he finds a concealed weapon, he can arrest the attacker on another charge;' 6 if no
weapon is found, the offender must be released. When the victim is able
and willing to go downtown and sign a complaint against his attacker, a
warrant can be issued for his arrest. But, again, no arrest is likely to be
made unless the assailant can be identified. If the officer should take steps
to compel the assailant to reveal his identity, 7 the officer is subject to
criminal and civil action for assault and battery.'
Similarly, if an officer answers a domestic disturbance call involving a
husband beating his wife, the officer cannot remove the husband unless
the wife first signs a complaint. Often because she cannot leave her
children or because she fears her husband's reprisals, the woman refuses
12. PA.

STAT. ANN.

tit. 18,

§

4406 (1963).

13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4708 (1963).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4709 (1963).
15. Terry v. Ohio, 389 U.S. 950 (1968).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4416 (1963).

17. Commonwealth v. Stirk, 5 LASc. LAW REV. 415 (1888).
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to swear out the complaint. The officer is then forced, under the law, to
leave her to the dubious mercies of her irate mate. If the woman should
sign the complaint, the husband is usually gone when the police officer
returns to serve it.
Malicious Mischief. "Whoever shall willfully and maliciously destroy
damage or injure any article of real or personal property of another...
is guilty of a misdemeanor. . .

."

If the police receive a call that a gang

of four boys meeting a certain description is roaming a neighborhood,
breaking windows, damaging automobiles, and otherwise destroying
property, and if the police proceed to that neighborhood and discover
four boys meeting the description given them by the complainant, they
cannot arrest the boys without a warrant unless they actually see the
acts of vandalism. Again, they have no authority to compel the boys to
reveal their identity or where they live. Unless the identity of the offenders can be learned from some other source, making an arrest pursuant
to a duly issued warrant possible, there is no way to bring them to justice.
Although the rules of arrest affecting the situations outlined above
have long existed, they were, until recently, largely ignored. Police readily
took custody of shoptlifters turned over by storekeepers who had caught
them in the act. The street peddler who exhibited his wares without a
permit or in a location prohibited by the ordinance was promptly arrested
and fined.
Loitering arrests were made under a vast number of circumstances.
Arrests on the loitering charge have been the primary tool for the control
of street corner prostitutes. A prositute well known to the police for her
activity, when observed standing on the sidewalk or in a doorway but in
no way obstructing the sidewalk, was likely to be arrested, charged with
loitering, and held at the station during the evening hours when her
business would have been brisk. This approach had the effect of encouraging the prostitute to move on to a different city. The loitering charge was
also used by police to arrest cruising homosexuals and "tricks" who were
likely to be beaten and robbed if allowed to remain on the streets. As in
the case of prostitutes, these persons were, in most cases, in no way
interfering with the use of the sidewalk or the street by other citizens.
The loitering charge was also used to implement effective police patrol.
Gangs of youths roaming high crime neighborhoods, without regard to
whether they were actually blocking the sidewalk, were told by the police
to disperse and move on. No command is effective if the one who issues it
lacks a remedy to apply to those who disobey. For the police, the usual
remedy for disobeyance of such a command was arrest on the loitering
charge. Thus, police who observed a gang which left to follow its own
instincts would commit acts ranging from vandalism to robbery were
able to exert control and prevent such crimes by removing the likely
offenders from the street.
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4916.1 (1963).
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Finally, the loitering charge was used to assist merchants in areas
where large numbers of youths on the street discouraged potential customers from visiting their stores. These merchants received quick response
from police when they reported systematic harassment of passersby or
even blocking of display windows. When the police appeared, the harassment naturally stopped, but orders were given to the offenders to leave
the area. These orders were usually obeyed.
The disorderly conduct charge was used not only when a police officer
observed a person being loud and boisterous to the disturbance of the
public, but also when insulting remarks were directed to and heard solely
by an officer. Thus, if the officer's badge and demeanor were not sufficient
to command the outward demonstration of respect considered essential
by the policeman to maintain order on his beat, he "enforced" respect by
the use of his arrest power and an attendant fine.
As for misdeanors such as assault and battery or malicious mischief,
the police officer and citizen alike never so much as considered the restrictions in the common law rules of arrest as a bar to immediate apprehension of the offender. If a police officer had refused to arrest a fleeing
criminal in situations such as those outlined above because he had not
actually seen the offense, he would have been considered derelict in his
duty by all concerned.
As pointed out above, the legal restrictions on arrest are not new, but
recent years have seen the emergence of factors which have focused on
their enforcement. Chief among these factors has been the organization
of the Neighborhood Legal Services under the Economic Opportunity
Act. The Neighborhood Legal Services has filled the vacuum which existed
in legal representation for those persons who were the most usual targets
of the described police practices. The work of the Neighborhood Legal
Services has been supplemented by that of active civil rights organizations and an increasingly general interest among members of the bar in
providing legal representation for the poor.
As a consequence, the police officer finds that his testimony on a summary offense or misdemeanor arrest, far from being met with the former
almost automatic finding of guilt or prima facie case by the police
magistrate, is now often subject to rigorous cross examination, review by
higher courts, and perhaps, even becomes the source of civil or criminal
action against him.
Further, this greatly increased after-the-fact supervision over the
police officer's action on arrests for minor offenses has occurred concurrently with a change in attitude toward him and toward his position.
Youth in low income neighborhoods who once regarded the policeman
with unquestioned respect and even fear now taunt and deride him. The
officer has become the visible and vulnerable target of the revolution
which is occurring in our country. The removal of the broad powers that
he once exercised, however unauthorized they were by the law, has left
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him ill-equipped to deal with the present crisis. Residents and merchants
in low income, high crime neighborhoods, not understanding the circumstances behind the increasing enforcement of the restrictions on
arrest powers, realize only that the policeman is not serving them as he
once did and accuse him of "throwing in the towel."' 9
Thus, the police officer is subjected to attack from two sides; from the
youth on the streets who are his responsibility to control and from the
"law abiding" residents of the neighborhoods he is charged to protect.
And into his daily battles with these two sides and their legal representafives has been thrust the increasing outcry and protest over the actions
of the United States Supreme Court.

II
In recent years, much attention has been focused on the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court in the areas of search and seizure, interrogation, and line-up identifications. It is these decisions, not the
common law rules of arrest, which have been the most frequently blamed
for "handcuffing the police" and creating the "barbed wire of legalisms ' 20
which make it impossible for the policeman to perform his job. These
decisions have indeed created difficulties in police investigation, but not
to the extent and not in the manner claimed by their detractors.
First it should be noted that decisions of the Supreme Court in such
cases as Mapp v. Ohio,2' Aguilar v. Texas,22 Miranda v. Arizona23 and

United States v. Wade2 4 have little if any effect on the apprehension and
conviction of the perpetrators of the common types of "street crime."
If a citizen is assaulted, robbed, or raped by a person whom he has never
seen before, unless the police are nearby and able to apprehend the
criminal immediately, there is little chance that he will ever be brought
to justice.
The "street criminal" usually attacks swiftly and from behind. Often
his crime is committed on impulse arising from his sudden awareness
that he and his victim are the only persons on a dimly lit side street. He
leaves no fingerprints and no witnesses other than his victim. When the
police receive the report of such a crime they have no leads to follow, no
place to begin an investigation. When police have no identifiable suspect,
judicial restrictions on search or interrogation never come into play.
Thus, it is not the Supreme Court's decisions, but rather the facts of
the case, which "handcuff" the police and prevent apprehension of the
19. Pittsburgh Press, June 14, 1968, at 2, col. 1. Report of testimony of Abe Kronzek
at a hearing conducted by District Attorney Robert W. Duggan.
20. Bickel, Crime, The Courts and the New Nixon, 158 THE NEw REPUBLIC 8 (June,
1968).
21. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
22. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
23. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
24. 389 U.S. 288 (1967).
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criminal. If any part of the responsibility for the alarming increase in
hit and run street crime is to be laid to legal restrictions on police action,
it is the common law rules governing arrest and the actual enforcement
of these rules (which preclude the once common police practice of preventive arrest) which should be cited.
The same point is valid with respect to a different type of crime. The
nighttime burgular, the bank robber, the narcotics dealer, or the murderer
may leave fingerprints on fixtures or other physical evidence at the crime
scene. He may have been photographed by hidden cameras or noticed by
passersby while "casing" his "job." Informants or undercover agents may
have passed information about him to the police, or he may be betrayed
by the existence of a motive growing out of his discoverable relationship
with his victim.
Crimes of this type do lend themselves to follow-up investigations, and
the effect of the Supreme Court's decisions on these investigations cannot
be denied. Generally, however, experienced detectives and competent,
uniformed officers have found that, while the decisions do require a refinement of technique, they pose no real obstacle to their investigations.
The intelligent investigator seldom loses evidence because of an inadequate search warrant. He has learned from his training and experience
how to draft an acceptable affidavit, and he is inclined to agree with the
principles on which such cases as Mapp25 and Aguilar 26 are based. He is
well aware of cases such as McCray v. Illinois,27 which allows him to protect the confidentiality of his informants, and Warden v. Hayden,28 which
allows him to search for any evidence which might implicate his suspect.
He has also learned the patience which allows him to refrain from making
a search before obtaining a warrant when time permits; he is, however,
29
which sanctions the search without a
also aware of Kerr v. California,
warrant when circumstances demand it.
The Court's decision in Wade ° establishing the right to counsel of a
suspect placed in a police line up was accepted by the intelligent police
officer without complaint. The presence of counsel makes the officer conducting the line up careful to avoid mistakes which, brought out in cross
examination of the identifying witness, could destroy the probative value
of the identification.
Even the Miranda1 decision which established that the suspect had to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to confer with counsel before
25. See note 19, supra.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See
386
387
374

note
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

20, supra.
300 (1967).
294 (1967).
23 (1963).

30. See note 22, supra.
31. See note 21, supra.
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being interrogated, while having a32measurable effect, has not "handcuffed"
the police in their investigations.
There are many competent and intelligent police officers who have
come to accept the Court's decisions as a necessary condition of their
employment. These men, many of them detectives responsible for investigations of major crimes, continue to function effectively. Unfortunately,
however, there are a substantial number of policemen who have made no
attempt to understand the restrictions arising from recent court decisions
and who react to their imposition with hostility and resentment. This latter group consists mainly of patrol officers whose job it is to keep order
on the streets and to apprehend offenders in the act of committing crimes.
They seldom conduct investigations in which the problems of search and
seizure and interrogation arise.
One might ask, then, how the recent court decisions affect these men at
all. Paradoxically, the effect is very real. It is found not in the exclusion
of evidence or the loss of prosecutions, but rather in the depressed morale
and bitter attitudes toward our system for the administration of justice.
The incessant editorial comment and political oratory relating to the
"coddling of criminals" by the United States Supreme Court has led these
men, who have often never so much as been called to testify in a hearing
or a motion to suppress evidence, into a malaise of self-pity.
This general depression takes its toll in the policeman's performance of
his duty. He feels, however incorrectly, that he has been stripped by the
Court of his power to perform under pressures on his beat which are increasing daily. He may even blame the Courts for the uncontrollable conditions he meets. The defensiveness engendered by these feelings in turn
exacerbates the worsening conditions and increases the lack of respect for
the policeman felt in the community.
Those upon whom the patrol officer formerly relied for support-the
community, the courts, and even his own superiors-seem to the defensive
policeman to have taken a stand against him. For many of these men, the
answer to our present problems of a rising crime rate and community
unrest seems simple-a speedy return to the old order. In view of the
impossibility of this solution, their effectiveness remains impaired.
CONCLUSION
While the decisions of the United States Supreme Court have had
their effect on the growing inability of the police to maintain order and
safety on our streets, they are less responsible than is widely claimed.
The primary cause of our present problems (the increasing dissatisfaction
with the social injustice inherent in our society) has little relation to the
procedural law. But even if the procedural law is to be singled out as a
32. Seeburger and Wettick, "MRANDA" IN PITTSBuRG-A STATISTICAL STUDY, 29 U. PITT.
L. REv. 1 (1967).
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contributing factor to the partial impotence of our police in holding the
control they so long maintained, it is not the recently imposed restrictions
on search, interrogation, and other investigatory techniques upon which
attention should focus. Rather, it is the newly established supervision
over the application of our long-standing common law rules of arrest.
In viewing the problems which our changing system of laws and administration of justice have brought upon the police, the reader must
remember that adjustment by individual police officers calls for far more
than the simple learning or relearning of these rules. The police officer
who worked for many years under a system which imposed few actual
restraints on the methods he used in performing his assigned tasks
developed what might be called an occupational personality.3 3 The values
of human decency, common sense, and fairness were elements of this
personality. So too, were the expectations of unquestioning respect for
his badge, the authority it represented, and, above all, support when he
"got the right man," regardless of how he got him.
Now, however, the police officer finds himself increasingly unable to
exert the control he once exercised over those persons who, in his view,
constituted a threat to the peace and safety of his district. He can no
longer expect the support he once received as a matter of course from
the minor judiciary. In place of this support has appeared the defense
attorney whose questions focus not on the guilt or innocence of his
client, but on the methods exercised in the apprehension of that person.
This phenomenon has had the effect of undermining many of those
qualities in the policeman's personality and approach to his job which
once were the only factor in insuring the fair and decent disposition of
cases at the minor judiciary level. The policeman has been put on the
defensive and this in turn has increased the polarization between police
and youth and police and minority groups.
Mere changes in the law will never resolve these basic problems. However, if our society expects its peace officers to enforce the substantive
laws it has promulgated, it must give these officers adequate powers,
without doing violence to the fundamental principles in our constitution,
to perform this task.
33. See J. SKNoLNIcK, JUSTICE WITEOUT TRIAL: LAw ENFORCENENT IN DEmOCRATIC
SociEaT (1966). See ch. 3, 9, 10 and 11 for a discussion of the policeman's personality and
other factors contributing to his present dilemma.

